



PAKISTAN-US STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: A REVIEW PAPER

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ABSTRACT

Following 9/11, Pakistan became one of the most important recipients of US foreign aid in the fight against extremist and militant elements in Afghanistan and the borderlands. Military, non-military, and humanitarian development funding were provided by the United States. The primary goal of Pakistan's financial assistance was to improve the security forces' ability and capabilities in the face of new types of warfare. Financial aid was intended to improve the Pak-US strategic partnership, but all futuristic silver aspirations were dashed when it became a point of conflict between the partners, and a trust deficit arose over the problem of financial aid mishandling. The US has charged both the civilian and military governments of Pakistan with corruption. The dispute between Washington and Islamabad over financial aid harmed not only the cooperation, but also the security forces' attempts to combat terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Keywords: Pakistan, USA, Financial Aid, Military.

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INTRODUCTION:

Pakistan's economic growth and development have been reliant on foreign help since its beginning. Pakistan is projected to have received \$73 billion in foreign aid from bilateral and multilateral sources between 1947 and 2001. In this regard, the United

States is the single largest donor of aid to Pakistan's official development, accounting for up to 30% of the total. This quantity of financial assistance may have swayed the civil and military leadership to support the US in providing strategic cover for her policies in the region, particularly in the face of possible communist

expansion. Pakistan aimed to benefit from US geopolitical support as well as financial and military help by signing SEATO and CENTO and other military and mutual assistance pacts in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite this, Pakistan was seen as a solid ally in the fight against communism in South Asia (Hilali, 2007, p. 45). The events of 9/11 not only altered the fundamental fabrics of US and Pakistani foreign policies toward one another, but they also dramatically altered the flow of aid to Islamabad from the 1950s and 1960s, which was primarily related to civil development, to Pakistan's cooperation in counter-insurgency efforts in Afghanistan and the borderland area after 9/11. Pakistan received strategic focused help in 1979, which lasted until 1989. With no attention paid to developing people-related institutions, this strategy merely bolstered the military and its clandestine agencies, and after a brief hiatus, the term strategic partnership reappeared. According to the new marriage of convenience, a large sum of money has been granted to the 'Khaki' establishment in order to achieve regional strategic goals [Wanandi, 2002, p. 186]. Nearly 90 military operations in Pakistan were sponsored by the United States. Since 2001, Pakistan has been a vital ally in the fight against terrorism, and the United States has backed Pakistani military operations against Islamist insurgents along the Pak-Afghan borderland. In addition, the United States established the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) to reimburse Pakistan's army for operating costs. CSF accounted for over a third of the Washington-provided funds to Islamabad. CSF stationed around a thousand soldiers in the Pak-Afghan borderland area, according to then-US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Other committees and agencies were also established to channel and maintain track of financing, but disagreements and complaints between Pakistani and American officials plagued the cooperation throughout the first half-decade. However, studying working committees, groups, military and non-military support, and development plans is important in order to comprehend each other's positions and then analyze the areas of conflict.

Joint military drills and weapon sales between Pakistan and the United States:

This committee's main task was to devise a strategy for cooperative military drills and weapon sales between

Pakistan and the United States. The Defence Consultative Group was constituted for this purpose. However, as time passed, doubts regarding the operation of DCG were expressed not just by Americans, but also by Pakistanis. Both countries' publics have questioned the conversation method as well as the DCG agenda. The primary focus of DCG was the provision and sale of military equipment to Pakistan, which produced a significant breach between the two countries because Pakistan was not prepared to utilize the weapons according to US orders. This mistrust was a major roadblock in the struggle against extremists. Pakistan's interests in military paraphernalia are allegedly commercialized, according to US sources, and she is unwilling to adhere by the DCG's demands [Mazari, 2008]. Pakistan's objections to the name "SOFA" were explicit, with the country stating that "SOFA" is a disparaging phrase in the negotiation process and that the idea should not be considered in any way. The US authorities have issued rebuttal calls over the SOFA negotiating procedure, which is based on a technical team of specialists. On the Pakistani side, it sabotages the process on a regular basis. Pakistan was looking for concrete evidence of the US's long-term commitment. The significance of the SOFA was depicted as one of the preconditions for the fulfillment of such agreements with Pakistan. It is fair to claim that Pakistan, as one of the allies, has overlooked long-term bilateral relations in favor of transient preferences. It's important to recall that the trilateral military commanders' panel (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States) was formed with the primary purpose of settling the Afghan insurgency situation on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border as well as within Afghanistan. According to the proclamation, this commission will lead to the growth of mutual interests and the establishment of trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. As part of the agreement, NATO and ISAF forces in Afghanistan were bolstered. A number of the meetings were held in Kabul in 2009. Pakistan's inclusion of the chief of army staff (COAS) and chief of general staff (COGS) on the trilateral relationship commission bolstered the country's stance. The members expressed their commitment by stating that a commission of this nature will undoubtedly increase trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan [Khan, 2009].

The two countries have reached an agreement to combat the menace of terrorism:

The two countries have reached an agreement to combat the menace of terrorism. Under the approved CSF program, a significant amount of compensation was supplied to Pakistan's law enforcement agencies with the goal of ensuring that Pakistan's participation in the fight on terror is in the best interests of America's goals. It was previously argued that the primary purpose of CSFs was to re-imbrue the cost of expenses incurred by Pakistan in the fight against militants, rather than to create capability. Nonetheless, the money was spent on military equipment rather than counter-terrorism operations by the security personnel. Reimbursements, sales of various types of weapons, and improvements to internal security measures were all part of this aid. Furthermore, \$3.1 billion was spent on the creation of various social programs as a fraction of the total amount spent. The US begged for a spending audit of development program monies, but the US authorities were met with a hostile response from Pakistan about the audit of expenditures [Perlez, 2007].

Reimbursement for Military Service:

It's worth noting that Pakistan received a large amount of US help in exchange for its strength, empowerment, and military measures against rebels near the Pak-Afghan border. In terms of re-imburement, Pakistan is one of the largest recipients in the US battle on militancy, accounting for 81 percent of all allies [Johnson , 2008]. The major motive for the issuance of huge amounts of CSFs was to assist in the military activities of Pakistani forces and the expenditure of war money along their borders. Furthermore, the program provides a higher increase in the amount for more people who participate in anti-insurgent measures; these monies were only available for massive or surgical anti-insurgent efforts, not for casual operations. Pakistan's requests were presented to US officials as follows:

- Air support and patrol fuel for air aid
- Air traffic control and air supply to the affected areas
- Maritime interests and patrols [Johnson, 2008, pp. 7-8].

The native soldiers' education:

Additionally, the international security trainers training was given to Pakistan under the name of International Military Education and Training on practical grounds the training of native soldiers and the creation of mind-to-mind communication and professional Excellencies between US and Pakistani military forces (IMET). The importance of these trainers and trainings for the Pakistan army in ensuring their essential position in national politics was extremely effective. These trainings will change Pakistan's army's attitude about the country's democratic system's stability and consistency. When the situation between two countries became serious in 1990, IMET ceased operations. In the fiscal years 2002-2004, however, \$1 billion was given annually. Officers numbered 106 in 2006, with a total of 275 trainers to guide them in military assistance. The method was to introduce recently acquired American weapons to Pakistani military [Bruce, 2002].

Religious fanaticism must be eradicated:

The following measures are clearly established by the US Department of State and Justice with regard to the elimination of religious extremism and contra-bound operations along border sides with Afghanistan, including smuggling, human trafficking, and other immeasurable inhumanitarian acts: [Seth G. Jones, pP. 125-160, 2006].

1. To instill managerial and leadership traits in lower-ranking police officers in order to improve their morale and communication abilities.
2. To implement a biometric technology to improve figure identification and collect criminal records.
3. To control the insurgency by sharing information about militants and establishing interdepartmental coordination for communication and detection [Seth G. Jones, pp. 125-160, 2006].

All of these efforts were made to strengthen Pakistan's defense agencies, as well as the country's border security, which includes anti-terrorism, border control of exit and entry check points on Pak-Afghan borders, and the complete elimination of poppy smuggling from Afghanistan to Pakistan [Seth G. Jones, 2006]. In fact, because to its uneven and rugged terrain near the

Afghan border, all of these endeavors have only yielded rudimentary results in FATA. However, highly trained and equipped forces were critical in suppressing insurgent activity. However, due to a significant funding and assistance shortage, negative internal security repercussions on a variety of counter-terrorism activities are widespread.

CONCLUSION:

Terrorism and extremism are an existential fact that can only be fought by cooperation and trust. This is also a reality in which states work together to attain mutually agreed-upon objectives. However, the realism perspective forbids the state from sacrificing its primary goals for the sake of the interests of other states. The major challenge to Pakistani security vanguards is India, thus they concentrate mostly on that side. Terrorism and militancy, on the other hand, are a secondary concern. The trust gap between Washington and Islamabad is mostly due to two factors. First, rather than eliminating terrorist sanctuaries in the Pak-Afghan borderland area, Pakistan have used US financial support to improve its capacity against India. Second, because there is no written record of aid presented by Pakistan, there is mismanagement and corruption in US support. Although many groups and committees were formed to channel cash, rather than resolving the disputes, the trust gap between the two countries widened. In the strategic relationship between Pakistan and the United States, humanitarian and civic infrastructure developments were linked to Washington's tactical goals, causing dissatisfaction among Pakistan's common people.

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